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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 and 2015, the North Carolina General Assembly, controlled 
by a Republican supermajority, passed local bills restructuring Wake 
County’s Board of Education and Board of County Commissioners, 
respectively. These bills were passed over the loud objection of the 
majority of the Wake County delegation and, indeed, the vast majority 
of the county’s voters. Wake County, home to the capital city of Raleigh 
and part of the state’s Research Triangle Park, has long been a 
progressive bastion in the state, with Democratic registration 
significantly outnumbering Republican registration in the county, and 
Democratic candidates regularly outperforming Republican 
candidates. With carefully manipulated district lines, those local bills 
would have ensured Republican control of both boards, despite the 
strong Democratic leaning in the county. 
Critically, in such a heavily Democratic county, the only way that 
the General Assembly could achieve such a drastic partisan skew was 
to overpopulate the Democratic-leaning districts and underpopulate 
the Republican-leaning districts, right up to what the legislature treated 
as a ten percent total deviation safe harbor. But the Supreme Court’s 
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“One-Person, One-Vote” (“OPOV”) jurisprudence makes clear that 
the equal weighting of citizens’ votes is vital to the functioning of our 
democracy. As Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence to the Supreme 
Court’s summary affirmance in Cox v. Larios,1 “the equal-population 
principle remains the only clear limitation on improper districting 
practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.” 2 
In the fifty or so years in which federal courts have been willing to 
meaningfully review legislatively-enacted redistricting plans, two race-
neutral approaches have emerged to define and explain why plans 
might be unconstitutionally unfair. The first is the equal population 
approach under the Equal Protection Clause,3 and the second is the 
partisan-gerrymandered case, which belief prohibits districting systems 
that are rigged to ensure that one political party remains in power 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.4 One of those—the equal 
population approach—has resulted in more success and a much more 
thorough jurisprudence. Judges have latched onto the idea that every 
voter should be able to cast a vote that is weighted the same as every 
other in a jurisdiction. As scholars have noted, though, “[o]ne person, 
one vote’s individualistic rhetoric may have come to obscure its original 
purposes of combating entrenchment and safeguarding majority rule.”5 
But these two approaches are not unrelated. One recent case brought 
as an equal population challenge could significantly develop the 
jurisprudence of partisan gerrymandering cases. 
In a country marked by increasing political polarization, such 
overstepping as seen in the Wake County, North Carolina, case is likely 
to be repeated across the country. Voting rights litigants achieved an 
important victory in 2016 when the Fourth Circuit ruled in consolidated 
challenges to those two local bills restructuring those county boards—
Wright v. North Carolina6 and Raleigh-Wake Citizens Association v. 
Wake County Board of Elections7—that the new redistricting plans 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal population guarantee. 
This Article examines the interplay between OPOV litigation and 
 
 1.  Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 2.  Id. at 949–50. 
 3.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 
 4.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314–15 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986). 
 5.  Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of 
Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 544 n.17 (2004).  
 6.  975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D.N.C. 2014).  
 7.  827 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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partisan gerrymandering cases using the Wake County case as the 
vehicle for understanding the relationship between the two legal 
approaches. The Article examines the genesis of the Wake County 
challenges, focusing on how the litigants successfully gathered evidence 
to demonstrate that illegitimate partisan considerations drove the 
population deviations. The Article concludes by positing how, even as 
partisan gerrymandering cases seem to finally be bearing fruit, the 
OPOV principle still provides the single most important “limitation on 
improper districting practices” and litigation under that theory should 
be pursued. This approach will create a legal atmosphere where 
partisan gerrymandering claims are more likely to succeed. 
I.  BACKGROUND JURISPRUDENCE 
Before embarking on this case study, it is important to trace the 
jurisprudential development of two legal theories significant to this 
case: the one-person, one-vote guarantee and unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering. 
A.  Development of the One Person, One Vote Principle 
The involvement of the federal judiciary in ensuring that electoral 
districts are evenly populated, and thus all voters across a jurisdiction 
cast an evenly-weighted vote, is relatively recent. When it came to 
apportionment and redistricting, the Supreme Court had long been 
wary of wading into difficult questions relating to political 
representation, and Justice Felix Frankfurter once famously cautioned, 
“[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”8 
That all changed, though, in 1962, when the Court authorized 
federal courts to begin entering the “political thicket” in Baker v. Carr.9 
In Baker, voters in Tennessee challenged the state’s 1901 law that 
apportioned the members of the General Assembly among the state’s 
ninety-five counties, where each county was apportioned at least one 
representative and one senator.10 Plaintiffs alleged that the uneven 
divvying created a “debasement of their votes” in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Because 
courts had not previously required jurisdictions to adjust district lines 
after a federal census or other population enumeration, by the 1960s, 
 
 8.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 9.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 10.  Id. at 188–89. 
 11.  Id.  
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many state legislatures were starkly malapportioned, and Tennessee 
was no exception. In his concurrence in Baker, Justice Douglas noted 
that “a single vote in Moore County, Tennessee, is worth [nineteen] 
votes in Hamilton County, that one vote in Stewart or in Chester 
County is worth nearly eight times a single vote in Shelby or Knox 
County.”12 The Supreme Court in Baker held that the political question 
doctrine does not foreclose review of redistricting cases simply because 
political rights are affected.13 
With courts now authorized to review constitutional challenges to 
reapportionment plans, the Supreme Court over the next two years 
articulated when such plans could run afoul of the Constitution, leading 
to the creation of the OPOV rule. In Gray v. Sanders,14 the Court noted: 
How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting 
power of another person in a statewide election merely because he 
lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? 
Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be 
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have 
an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, wherever 
their occupation, whatever their income, and whatever their home 
may be in that geographic unit. This is required by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.15 
It boiled down to this: “[t]he conception of political equality . . . can 
only mean one thing—one person, one vote.”16 The next year, in 
Reynolds v. Sims,17 striking down Alabama state legislative districts as 
unconstitutionally malapportioned, the Court explained that 
“[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres,”18 so Alabama’s 
desire to assign one senator to each county and to ensure that every 
county had at least one state representative was not justifiable, and 
instead only enshrined geographical and regional favoritism.19 The 





 12.  Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 13.  Id. at 209. 
 14.  372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
 15.  Id. at 379. 
 16.  Id. at 381. 
 17.  377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 18. Id. at 562. 
 19.  Id. at 543–44, 563. 
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If a [s]tate should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of 
the [s]tate should be given two times, or five times, or ten times the 
weight of votes of citizens in another part of the [s]tate, it could 
hardly be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the 
disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.20  
Thus, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional harm that can follow if 
anything other than population is used as the basis of apportionment 
of electoral districts. Avery v. Midland County21 then extended this rule 
to local redistricting.22 
But how can a jurisdiction redistrict to achieve this desired OPOV 
result? The Court has emphasized that while “[m]athematical 
exactness” in population amongst electoral districts is not a workable 
standard for state and local government redistricting, governments 
must nonetheless “make an honest and good faith effort to construct 
districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”23 The rule 
that has emerged is that where redistricting plans have a maximum or 
overall population deviation over ten percent, that deviation will create 
a prima facie case of discrimination and thus must be justified by the 
state.24 Under Roman v. Sincock,25 plans that have overall deviations 
under ten percent will not be immune from attack, but a plaintiff cannot 
rely on the deviation percentage alone to establish a constitutional 
harm and must provide further evidence to make his case.26 
Importantly, the Court then explained that “minor deviations” in 
redistricting plans are only acceptable insofar as they are “free from 
any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.”27 Relevant here, the 
Fourth Circuit gave that Roman rule some depth, explaining that in 
order to survive summary judgment plaintiffs must produce “credible 
evidence to establish that the apportionment plan at issue . . . was the 
product of bad faith, arbitrariness, or invidious discrimination.”28 
 
 
 20.  Id. at 562. 
 21.  390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
 22.  Id. at 485. 
 23.  Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. 
 24.  Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983). 
 25.  377 U.S. 695 (1964). 
 26.  See id. at 710 (noting the equal population “problem does not lend itself to any such 
uniform formula, and it is neither practicable nor desirable to establish rigid mathematical 
standards for evaluating the constitutional validity” of allegedly malapportioned plans). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1222 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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B.  Development (or a Lack) of a Justiciable Standard for Partisan 
Gerrymandering Claims 
Davis v. Bandemer29 was one of the first challenges to a 
reapportionment plan that arrived at the Supreme Court solely on the 
claims that it was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. The 
challengers in Bandemer alleged that the state legislative districts for 
the Indiana legislature had the intent and effect of securing Republican 
control of the legislature, to the detriment of Democratic voters, even 
though the state was considered a swing state and, indeed, Democratic 
candidates had receive majority of votes cast in both chambers in the 
first election held under the challenged plan.30 A three-judge panel in 
the district court found that the redistricting plans did, in fact, 
constitute unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders.31 The Court’s 
consideration of the case produced a splintered set of opinions, but six 
justices held that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable.32 
Beyond that, there was little agreement other than the fact that the 
district court in Bandemer got it wrong, largely because the Court 
concluded that because the challenged plan did not produce 
proportional representation for the political parties, challengers had 
failed their burden in establishing discriminatory intent.33 A plurality 
did agree that a partisan gerrymander violates the Equal Protection 
Clause only on a showing of “both intentional discrimination against 
an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on 
that group.”34 Justice Powell proposed a totality of circumstances 
approach, arguing that courts should look to a number of factors in 
analyzing partisan gerrymander, including “the legislative procedures 
by which the challenged redistricting was accomplished and the intent 
behind the redistricting; the shapes of the districts and their conformity 
with political subdivision boundaries; and ‘evidence concerning 
population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution.’”35 
The Court declined this standard, though, worrying that it would 
“invite[] judicial interference in legislative districting whenever a 
political party suffers at the polls.”36 
 
 29.  478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 30.  Id. at 115. 
 31.  Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
 32.  See Davis, 478 U.S. at 143. 
 33.  See id. at 129–31. 
 34.  Id. at 127. 
 35.  Id. at 138 (quoting id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 36.  Id. at 142. 
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Significantly, though, in concluding that partisan gerrymandering is 
justiciable, the Court spent a substantial amount of time connecting the 
question before its OPOV jurisprudence. The Court noted that, “in 
formulating the one person, one vote formula, [it] characterized the 
question posed by election districts of different sizes as an issue of fair 
representation,” and that if fair representation was central to the 
Reynolds Court’s finding that OPOV cases were justiciable, the same 
conclusion is warranted in the political gerrymandering realm.37 Thus, 
while the Court in Bandemer did not provide any meaningful relief to 
the specific litigants before it, it left the door open for future attack on 
partisan gerrymandering and linked the ultimate inquiry—fairness—to 
the Court’s concerns in the OPOV context. 
After Bandemer, litigants struggled to develop a manageable 
standard to offer to the Court for analyzing a partisan gerrymandering 
case, and defendants continued to appeal to the Court’s continued 
division on whether such cases were justiciable at all. These tensions 
again came to a head again in Vieth v. Jubelirer.38 In reviewing a partisan 
gerrymandering challenge to Pennsylvania’s congressional districts, the 
Court again was badly splintered. A plurality of the court, in voting to 
dismiss the case, agreed that partisan gerrymandering was non-
justiciable and thus would have overruled Bandemer,39 but Justice 
Kennedy declined to join the plurarity opinion, instead writing 
separately to concur and affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
case.40 Instead, he continued to assert that political gerrymandering 
claims were justiciable notwithstanding the Court’s inability to decide 
on a proper standard, yet, for judging those claims.41 Like the plurality 
and the court below, Justice Kennedy rejected “the fairness principle 
appellants propose . . . that a majority of voters in the Commonwealth 
should be able to elect a majority of the Commonwealth’s 
congressional delegation.”42 Instead, in pointing future litigants in a 
direction that would someday produce a manageable standard, he 
noted that “[a] determination that a gerrymander violates the law must 
rest . . . on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally 
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a manner 
 
 37.  Id. at 123–24. 
 38.  541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 39.  Id. at 281. 
 40.  Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 41.  Id. at 307. 
 42.  Id. at 308. 
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unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.”43 Finally, Justice 
Kennedy again reiterated the significance of the equal population 
jurisprudence to his belief that partisan gerrymandering was 
justiciable.44 Further analogizing the OPOV jurisprudence, Kennedy 
noted that the Court in Baker recognized the justiciability of 
malapportionment cases before the Court actually articulated a 
specific standard in Reynolds.45 Thus, opponents of partisan 
gerrymandering, while making no progress, lived to fight another day. 
The Court’s most recent pronouncement on partisan 
gerrymandering came from a complex case out of Texas following the 
state’s mid-decade redistricting—League of United Latin Am. Citizens 
v. Perry (“LULAC”).46 There, a federal court had redrawn the state’s 
congressional districts after the 2000 census, when the legislature, 
under split-partisan control could not agree on a plan.47 However, 
Republicans took control of the legislature in 2002, and in 2003, redrew 
the state’s congressional districts to give Republicans a strong majority 
in the delegation.48 Because population deviations between 
congressional districts are generally required to be as close to zero as 
possible,49 the mid-decade redistricting plan did not create any 
opportunity to challenge the deviations on OPOV grounds. That did 
not, however, keep creative litigants from arguing that the redistricting 
process still violated the equal population guarantee.50 
The Court this time did not even bother revisiting the justiciability 
question, but did “examine whether appellants’ claims offer the Court 
a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining whether a 
partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”51 It concluded they 
did not.52 
Appellants in LULAC offered two distinct theories of partisan 
gerrymandering. The first was a “sole motivation” standard, arguing 
 
 43.  Id. at 307. 
 44.  See id. at 310 (“Our willingness to enter the political thicket of the apportionment 
process with respect to one-person, one-vote claims makes it particularly difficult to justify a 
categorical refusal to entertain claims against this other type of gerrymandering.”). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 47.  Id. at 411 (2006). 
 48.  Id. at 412. 
 49. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 50.  See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 413 (presenting the court with two different theories on why 
mid-decade redistricting with decennial census data was problematic). 
 51.  Id. at 414. 
 52.  Id. at 417. 
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that engaging in “mid-decennial redistricting, when solely motivated by 
partisan objectives, violates equal protection and the First 
Amendment because it serves no legitimate public purpose and 
burdens one group because of its political opinions and 
affiliation.”53 Appellants focused on motivation, particularly with mid-
decade redistricting, because it would obviate the need to deal with the 
messy proposition of measuring the discriminatory effects of partisan 
gerrymandering.54 Ultimately though, the Court concluded that while 
the legislature decided to redistrict “with the sole purpose of achieving 
a Republican congressional majority,” such partisan goals did not 
“guide every line it drew,” because some districts had lines informed by 
“mundane and local interests.”55 
More importantly here, the second standard focused on OPOV 
grounds. Specifically, appellants argued that because the census data 
would be further outdated and inaccurate mid-decade than it was when 
first used for decennial redistricting, the decision to redistrict mid-
decade was a strong indicator that bad faith motivated the process.56 
Therefore, the practice of mid-decade redistricting meant that the 
legislature had not made a good faith effort to achieve equal 
population.57 Unfortunately, the Court concluded that “[t]his is a test 
that turns not on whether a redistricting furthers equal-population 
principles but rather on the justification for redrawing a plan in the first 
place. In that respect appellants’ approach merely restates the question 
whether it was permissible for the Texas Legislature to redraw the 
districting map.”58 Thus, as of 2006, attempts to gain any traction in the 
Supreme Court in challenging partisan gerrymandering remain largely 
unsuccessful, but such claims are still not categorically barred. 
C.  The Larios Case – A Successful Challenge to a Plan with Less than 
10% Deviation 
Because the burden on challengers of plans with less than ten 
percent overall deviation requires them to produce additional evidence 
besides the deviation to prove a plan is unconstitutional, challenges to 
plans with deviations under ten percent have been relatively rare. 
However, a case from Georgia in the early 2000s helped to define the 
 
 53.  Id. at 416–17. 
 54.  Id. at 417. 
 55.  Id. at 417–18. 
 56.  Id. at 420–21. 
 57.  Id. at 421. 
 58.  Id. at 422 (internal citations omitted). 
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types of evidence that challenges can rely upon to invalidate a plan with 
a total deviation under ten percent. 
In Larios v. Cox,59 Republican voters challenged on OPOV grounds 
Georgia’s 2001 and 2002 redistricting plans for the State House and 
Senate, respectively.60 Democrats controlled the legislature at the time, 
but the 2010 census revealed that areas dominated by Republican 
voters, including suburban areas surrounding Atlanta, grew at a much 
larger rate than southern Georgia, which was rural and more 
Democratic.61 The enacted House and Senate plans each had an overall 
deviation of 9.98%.62 In both, the underpopulated districts were 
primarily Democratic-leaning, and the overpopulated districts were 
primarily Republican-leaning.63 Also in both, most of the 
underpopulated districts were either in southern Georgia or within the 
urban parts of Atlanta—the more Democratic-leaning regions of the 
state.64 In the House plan, fifty percent of all Republican incumbents 
were drawn into districts with another incumbent, but only nine percent 
of Democratic incumbents.65 In the Senate, the plan paired forty-two 
percent of all Republican incumbents, but only six percent of 
Democratic incumbents.66 
A three-judge panel at the district court level found that both direct 
and circumstantial evidence left “no doubt that a deliberate and 
systematic policy of favoring rural and inner-city interests at the 
expense of suburban areas north, east and west of Atlanta led to a 
substantial portion of the 9.98% population deviations in both of the 
plans.”67 It found that this systematic approach of over- and under-
populating districts based on the voting patterns in the districts “led to 
a significant overall partisan advantage for Democrats in the electoral 
maps.”68 The court thus concluded that “[t]he population deviations in 
the Georgia House and Senate Plans are not the result of an effort to 
further any legitimate, consistently applied state policy.”69 
Furthermore, the reasons for the deviations—to allow rural and urban 
 
 59.  300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
 60. Id. at 1324–25. 
 61.  Id. at 1322–23. 
 62.  Id. at 1326–27. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 1326. 
 66.  Id. at 1327. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 1331. 
 69.  Id. at 1338. 
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regions of the state to hold onto legislative influence beyond what their 
populations should allow and to protect Democratic incumbents while 
undermining Republican incumbents—did not withstand Fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny.70 
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the 
ruling.71 Of course, a summary affirmance has limited precedential 
value, so “should not be understood as breaking new ground but as 
applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts 
involved.”72 However, the summary affirmance was still significant, as 
explicated by the concurrences filed with the order. Justice Stevens, 
with whom Justice Breyer joined in concurring, wrote that the district 
court’s findings disclosed two reasons for the unconstitutional 
population deviations in the enacted plans—the favoring of rural and 
urban over suburban interests, and an “intentional effort to allow 
incumbent Democrats to maintain or increase their delegation, 
primarily by systematically underpopulating the districts held by 
incumbent Democrats, by overpopulating those of Republicans, and by 
deliberately pairing numerous Republican incumbents against one 
another.”73 Even more significantly, Justice Stevens explained: 
In challenging the District Court’s judgment, appellant invites us to 
weaken the one-person, one-vote standard by creating a safe harbor 
for population deviations of less than 10 percent, within which 
districting decisions could be made for any reason whatsoever. The 
Court properly rejects that invitation. After [Vieth v. Jubelirer], the 
equal-population principle remains the only clear limitation on 
improper district practices, and we must be careful not to dilute its 
strength.74 
Ironically, the concurrence noted that had the Court adopted a 
standard for partisan gerrymandering in Vieth, what happened in 
Georgia would have surely have satisfied any proposed standard.75 
Significantly, at least in Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer’s minds, 
OPOV claims and partisan gerrymandering claims are not unrelated—
both can present opportunities to restrain the toxic effect of rank 
partisanship in redistricting. Even where the partisan gerrymandering 
jurisprudence has not yet developed to the point where plans can be 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 72.  Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). 
 73.  Cox, 542 U.S. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1329). 
 74.  Id. at 949–50 (internal citations omitted). 
 75.  Id. at 950. 
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invalidated under that theory, the well-established OPOV rule can fill 
the gap. Larios thus created instructive guidance for the case examined 
in this Article. 
Of course, Larios was not the first or only case invalidating a 
redistricting plan with less than ten percent overall deviation. In Hulme 
v. Madison County,76 a district court found that a districting scheme for 
a county board of commissioners, with a population deviation of just 
9.3%, violated the Equal Protection Clause.77 The court found the 
deviations were arbitrary and discriminatory because the main cause 
of the deviations was the intent to “create districts that would not 
simply disadvantage Republican members of the Board, but 
‘cannibalize’ their districts to the greatest extent possible.”78 The 
chairman of the county board provided evidence of such discriminatory 
intent when he infamously explained to an opponent of the plan: “We 
are going to shove it [the map] up your f ass and you are going to like 
it, and I’ll f any Republican I can.”79 Few litigants enjoy such frank 
admissions from proponents of challenged redistricting plans. 
After Larios, a three-judge panel in Texas found a discriminatory 
pattern in challenged districts with population deviations falling below 
even five percent. The court in Perez v. Perry80 applied a preliminary 
injunction standard as the basis for drawing an interim, court-ordered 
plan for the State House where the enacted plan employed a scheme 
of overpopulating and underpopulating districts based on the partisan 
preferences of the voters in the district.81 The federal court noted that: 
[E]nacted HD 41—the only district in Hidalgo County that has a 
realistic chance of electing a Republican—is substantially 
underpopulated (by 4.41% from the ideal district size), but the rest 
of the districts in the county are substantially overpopulated 
(2.83%, on average). This apparently systematic overpopulation of 
Democrat districts and underpopulation of the one possible 
Republican district presents serious concerns under Larios v. Cox . . 
. . Thus, the plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits on 
their one-person, one-vote claims with respect to HD 41.82 
 
 
 76.  188 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Ill. 2001). 
 77.  Id. at 1051. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  No. 5:11-cv-360, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190609 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2012). 
 81.  Id. at *53–*54. 
 82.  Id. at *55–*56 (internal citations omitted). 
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Thus, even with what might arguably described as minimal 
population deviations, the Texas federal court invalidated districts for 
being constitutionally malapportioned. 
III.  BACKGROUND TO THE WRIGHT/RWCA CASES 
In 2010, Republicans took control of the North Carolina General 
Assembly for the first time in over one hundred years.83 When they 
redistricted the state legislative seats the next year, they created a 
supermajority for themselves that has persisted through the decade.84 
For decades before Republicans took control of the legislature, the 
standard practice for using local bills to pass legislation relevant only 
to a small number of counties in the state was that such bills were 
usually only pursued at the request of local elected bodies and with the 
unanimous support of the local legislative delegation.85 Thus, if City X 
wanted to restructure its municipal elections, it might be faster, if the 
request were noncontroversial, to ask the legislature to enact a local 
bill to achieve that end result more quickly. While of course there are 
always exceptions to the rule, this represented the long-standing 
practice of the legislature. After the Republican legislature had secured 
its own future political success, though, it turned to tinkering with how 
members of county government were elected, and one of the first of 
such efforts was directed at the Wake County Board of Elections. 
A.  Wake County Politics and the 2013 Legislative Process 
Wake County is home to North Carolina’s capital city, Raleigh, and 
hosts, with neighboring counties, North Carolina’s Research Triangle 
Park, a strong attractor of business and talent in the region. The county 
has grown tremendously over the last decade. Indeed, concomitant with 
that growth, the student population in Wake County Public School 
System grew 46.68% from 2000 to 2010, from 98,772 to 143,289 
 
 83.  Kim Severson, G.O.P.’s Full Control in Long-Moderate North Carolina May Leave 
Lasting Stamp, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/us/politics/gop-
to-take-control-in-long-moderate-north-carolina.html.  
 84.  Dan Boylan, Republicans Headed Toward Keeping Veto-proof Majorities, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/ 
article113483393.html.  
 85.  See, e.g., UNC CHAPEL HILL SCHOOL OF GOV’T, THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY:  OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE, LEGISLATION AND PROCESS OF NORTH 
CAROLINA’S LEGISLATURE 9 https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/cours 
e_materials/General %20Assembly%20Handout%20-%20Master_0.pdf (describing usual 
method of enacting local bills).  
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students.86 This growth resulted in fairly significant school 
overcrowding, and this problem was addressed by introducing year-
round schools, increasing the county’s magnet school program, and 
continuing the county’s socioeconomic diversity busing program.87 The 
latter, in particular, caused policy debate in the county and on the nine-
member school board. 
Prior to 2013, the nine members of the school board were elected, 
via non-partisan elections, from single member districts. For much of 
the 2000s, progressives controlled the non-partisan board.88 The 
decision to adopt a socioeconomic diversity assignment policy in 2000 
was supported by both Democrat and Republican school board 
members. But in 2009, partisan debates over the merits of the county’s 
socioeconomic diversity policy came to a head when a slate of 
Republican candidates overwhelmingly swept four of the nine school 
board seats up for election, and with the seats already held by 
Republicans, took control of the Board.89 The new Republican majority 
took immediate steps to replace the socioeconomic diversity 
assignment plan with a neighborhood student assignment policy. 
Huge public outcry ensued. The State Conference of the NAACP 
and parents of Wake County students filed a complaint under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act, arguing that neighborhood schools would result 
in highly segregated schools.90 Community organizers began work on 
ensuring that this change in approach would be central in voters’ mind 
when they voted in the 2011 school board elections.91 And in that 
election, registered Democrats won four of the five seats on the ballot 
in 2011, with an unaffiliated but progressive candidate winning the fifth 
seat.92 The results of this election were seen as a definitive rejection of 
conservative education policies and neighborhood school assignment 
plans.93 
 
 86.  See Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections (RCWA I), 166 F. 
Supp. 3d 553, 564 (E.D.N.C. 2016). 
 87.  Transcript of Testimony of School Board Member Bill Fletcher, Dec. 16, 2015, at 85:18-
86:23 (all trial transcripts on file with author). 
 88.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 564. 
 89.  Karen McMahan, Democrats Mobilize to Win Back Majority on Wake School Board, 
CAROLINA J. (July 28, 2011), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/democrats-mobilize-
to-win-back-majority-on-wake-school-board/. 
 90.  Sloane Heffernan, NAACP files complaint against Wake County schools, WRAL.COM 
(Sept. 25, 2010) http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/8348916/. 
 91.  Transcript of Testimony of Rev. Earl Johnson, Dec. 16, 2015, at 24:17-25:21, RWCA I, 
166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 92.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 568. 
 93.  Transcript of Testimony of School Board Member Christine Kushner, Dec. 16, 2015, at 
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Significantly, in that two-year period where Republicans controlled 
the school board, the board was tasked with redrawing its electoral 
districts to even out the population differences between the districts 
highlighted by the 2010 census results.94 The board hired a law firm 
frequently hired by Republican groups, and the firm drew a plan that 
would undoubtedly favor Republicans,95 but maintained the current 
method of election, drew compact districts, and achieved an overall 
population deviation of just 1.66%.96 Parents and community 
organizations were upset with this ploy, but of course, as it turned out, 
the subtle favoritism employed was not enough to overcome 
community outrage with the changes to the student assignment policy, 
and Republicans overwhelmingly lost in the 2011 elections.97 After the 
2011 election results, the Wake County Board of County 
Commissioners, responsible for allocating funds to the school board 
and temporarily controlled by a narrow Republican majority, set as one 
of its legislative goals seeking local legislation to ensure that a majority 
of the School Board was elected on an at-large basis.98 
Senate Bill 325 was filed in the North Carolina General Assembly 
on March 13, 2013, by Republican Senator Neal Hunt of Wake 
County.99 The billed called for redistricting the school board using 
seven numbered single-member districts and two lettered single-
member “super districts” that overlap the seven numbered districts, 
splitting Wake County into a doughnut shape with most of Raleigh in 
the center.100 Those super districts are displayed below: 
  
 
104:2-7, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 94.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 566. 
 95.  Transcript of Testimony of Sen. Dan Blue, Dec. 16, 2015, at 51:14-24, RWCA I, 166 F. 
Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 96.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 567. 
 97.  Id. at 568. 
 98.  Transcript of Testimony of Comm’r James West, Dec. 17, 2015, at 26:3-27:21, RWCA I, 
166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 99.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 568. 
 100.  Id. at 569. 
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The bill created a system in which each Wake County voter would 
vote for two school board representatives: one from the numbered 
district in which the voter resided, and one from the lettered district in 
which the voter resided.101 The plan split thirty-one precincts, whereas 
the 2011 plan passed by the Republican school board split only ten 
precincts.102 Significantly, the super districts had an overall population 
deviation of 9.8%.103 The outer “doughnut” district, comprised 
primarily of the more conservative and suburban parts of the county, 
was underpopulated by 4.9% and the inner urban district was 
overpopulated by 4.9%.104 Additionally, among the seven single-
member districts, the more urban districts primarily within Raleigh 
were overpopulated whereas the suburban districts were again 
underpopulated.105 Moreover, numerous incumbents who favored the 
county’s socioeconomic diversity plan were paired in the proposed 
districts, or drawn into heavily Republican-leaning districts. 
Reconstituted election results demonstrated that Republican 
candidates would win in five of the nine new districts, thus swinging 
control from Democrats to Republicans. The bill passed the Senate in 
April and the House in June, and was ratified on June 13, 2013.106 
As expected, proponents of Senate Bill 325 were not frank about 
the reasons motivating the unwanted legislation.107 Proponents alleged 
three main goals of the legislation: to give suburban voters a larger 
voice in school board governance;108 to allow Wake County voters to 
elect two members instead of just one;109 and to better align electoral 
districts with student assignment districts. These justifications would 
become central part of later litigation.110 Interestingly, though, 
Republican supporters of the bill rejected amendments from 
Democratic legislators that would have made  the  super  districts  true  
 
 
 101.  Id. at 568. 
 102.  Id. at 605. 
 103.  Id. at 559. 
 104.  Id. at 571. 
 105.  Id.; see also Transcript of Testimony of Anthony Fairfax, Dec. 16, 2015, at 138:6-21, 
RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5-15-CV-156-D). 
 106.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. at 573. 
 107.  Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Elections (RCWA II), 827 F.3d 333, 
349 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting “the stated reasons for the redistricting as pretextual”).  
 108.  Transcript of Testimony of Sen. Josh Stein, Dec. 17, 2015, at 20:25-21:4, RWCA I, 166 
F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 109.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. at 572. 
 110.  Id. at 571–72. 
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at-large districts, thus allowing voters to vote for three school board 
members.111 
Senate Bill 325 was wildly unpopular with Wake County residents 
and elected officials.112 In a public hearing hosted by the county’s 
legislative delegation on March 25, 2013, every member of the public 
who addressed the bill spoke against it.113 In April 2013, the school 
board adopted a resolution reaffirming its support for the current 
election process for its members and detailing why that process should 
be retained.114 Comments from the public during legislative committee 
hearings were also overwhelmingly in opposition to the bill.115 
Grassroots groups like the Raleigh Wake Citizens 
Association(“RWCA”) and Concerned Citizens for African-American 
Children (“CCAAC”) organized resistance to the bill and attendance 
at all legislative hearings.116 Members of these groups and other 
community activists sought legal assistance in evaluating the new plan 
and devising a legal strategy for opposing it.  
B.  Filing Wright v. North Carolina  
Two months after Senate Bill 325 was ratified, the grassroots groups 
and individuals who had organized against the proposed legislation 
took action. They filed a lawsuit claiming that the law violated the equal 
protection guarantees of the state and federal constitutions because it 
created an election system that unjustifiably weighted the vote of some 
voters in the county much more heavily than others, thus violating the 
OPOV principle. 
Importantly, the groups marshalling the legal challenge have been 
intimately involved in advocating for the county’s socioeconomic 
diversity policy.117 For example, Concerned Citizens for African-
American Children is a community-based organization dedicated to 
teaching parents about the policies, procedures, and laws that govern 
 
 111.  Id. at 572–73. 
 112.  Transcript of Testimony of Rev. Earl Johnson, supra note 91, at 25:22-28:4. 
 113.  Transcript of Testimony of Sch. Bd. Member Christine Kushner, supra note 93, at 
107:20-24. 
 114.  Transcript of Testimony of Sch. Bd. Member Bill Fletcher, supra note 87, at 89:14-18. 
 115.  See, e.g., Transcript of House Elections Committee Meeting, May 29, 2013 (on file with 
author) (statements of members of the public speaking out against the bill). 
 116.  Transcript of Testimony of Rev. Earl Johnson, Dec. 16, 2015, supra note 91, at 25:22-
28:4. 
 117.  Complaint at 6, Wright v. North Carolina, 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (No. 
5:13-CV-607).  
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the children who attend the Wake County Public School System.118 As 
a parent-based organization, CCAAC works to ensure that all children 
receive equitable educational opportunities, which lead them to fight 
against racially segregated schools and school discipline policies that 
disparately impacted children of color.119 Similarly, the Raleigh Wake 
Citizens Association is Raleigh’s oldest African-American political 
organization and aims to empower minorities in Raleigh and Wake 
County.120 Since its beginning, the RWCA’s purpose has been to 
protect, encourage, educate, and help the citizens of Raleigh and Wake 
County in their civic, economic, social, educational and political 
advancement. RWCA members have been active in advocating for high 
quality education for all children.121 
The theory of this suit was that Senate Bill 325 created a 
redistricting scheme similar to the one struck down in Larios.122 That is, 
while recognizing that the challenged plan had less than a ten percent 
overall deviation, some of the same patterns seen in Larios were also 
present here. In Larios, the Democratic plan favored urban and rural 
voters over suburban by underpopulating districts in the former 
areas—here, the plan favored suburban voters by placing them into 
underpopulated districts.123 Likewise, as in Larios, where Republican 
incumbents were targeted for defeat by being paired in a district with 
another incumbent, incumbents here who were registered Democrats 
or otherwise favored progressive policies were either paired or placed 
into politically-hostile districts.124 And, like in Larios, the plan was 
designed to secure electoral success for a party whose voters were not 
numerous enough to warrant extensive electoral success—that is, the 
plan illegitimately favored one political party.125  
Thus, because the deviations in the Wake school board plan existed 
only to further illegitimate redistricting goals, this plan violated the 
one-person, one vote guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment just like 
the Georgia state legislative redistricting plans did.126 Relying on 
 
 118.  Id. at 5. 
 119.  Id. at 6.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 2–3.  
 123.  RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 351 (4th Cir. 2016); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327–
28 (N.D. Ga. 2004).  
 124.  See Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 265 (4th Cir. 2015); Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1329. 
 125.  RWCA II, 827 F.3d at 346–47; Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1331. 
 126.  Complaint at 19–20, Wright, 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (No. 5:13-CV-607).  
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guidance derived from Roman and then applied by the Fourth Circuit 
in Daly v. Hunt,127 the plaintiffs argued that plans with deviations under 
ten percent could be found invalid if the deviations derive from 
arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith considerations.128 Applying a 
fairly standard Fourteenth Amendment intentional discrimination 
analysis, the challengers planned to demonstrate that any alleged 
justifications were prextextual or nonsensical, and thus it was the 
illegitimate motives, not the allegedly legitimate ones, that drove the 
deviations in the enacted plan.129 
However, the district court hearing the Wright case rejected 
plaintiffs’ framing of the case. In early 2014, the district court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ complaint for failing to state a claim. It said, “[t]o claim 
impermissible political bias is to claim political gerrymandering. To 
claim political gerrymandering is to raise a claim that is nonjusticiable. 
Plaintiffs’ attempt to dress a political gerrymandering claim in OPOV 
clothing fails to state a claim for which this Court may grant relief.”130  
The district court was both wrong and right, at least in a certain 
sense—the motivations being attacked were certainly partisan, but the 
constitutional injury was different.131 Unequally populated districts 
create a harm distinct from a redistricting plan that, as a whole, was 
intended to and has the effect of discriminating against voters of a 
particular party. Plaintiffs appealed that ruling to the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit. 
C.  The 2015 Legislative Process 
Although the decision in Wright was still pending, during the early 
part of the 2015 North Carolina General Assembly legislative session, 
the legislature did not feel compelled to wait for a ruling from the 
circuit court before replicating the same strategies employed in the 
Wake County school board case. The Wake County Board of 
Commissioners quickly became the next target. While Republicans had 
enjoyed narrow control over the county commission when they urged 
changes to the Wake County school board, that control was ephemeral. 
Democrats in 2014 seized back control of the County Commission, and 
 
 127.  93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 128.  Wright, 787 F.3d at 265.  
 129.  Complaint at 19–20, Wright, 975 F. Supp. 2d 539 (No. 5:13-CV-607). The Fourteenth 
Amendment intentional discrimination standard was established in Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
 130.  Wright, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 546 (internal citation omitted). 
 131.  Id. at 545–46. 
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in 2015, all members of the County Commission were Democrats, and 
two were African-Americans.132 
Unlike the school board, the seven members of the county 
commission were all elected at-large. And unlike the school board 
elections, county commission elections were partisan elections.133 The 
swing of control of the Board to Democrats did not go unnoticed by 
the Republican-controlled legislature. 
On March 4, 2015, Republican Senator Chad Barefoot of Wake and 
Franklin Counties introduced Senate Bill 181.134 The local bill imposed 
the same electoral structure and districts set to be used for the Wake 
County school board on the Board of County Commissioners.135 The 
districts were identical, and thus the bill would increase the County 
Commission by two seats and favor Republicans in five of the nine 
districts.136 The bill was ratified in April of 2015.137 
Legislators used some of the same justifications for Senate Bill 181 
that they used for Senate Bill 325, although there were some interesting 
differences.138 Again, legislators argued that the “doughnut” district 
would give suburban voters more voice in local government.139 
However, proponents now raised the concern that it was too expensive 
for candidates to run countywide, and that moving to districts would 
alleviate that.140 Candidates running in the “doughnut” district would 
still essentially run countywide because the district spanned the entire 
perimeter of the county.141 Proponents also argued that moving from 
at-large elections to elections from districts only was necessary to avoid 
a lawsuit under the Voting Rights Act.142 Finally, proponents argued 
that it would be advantageous to have school board and county 
commission districts perfectly align, even though the appeal in Wright 
had already been argued and was pending decision.143 
Just as with the school board redistricting bill, Wake County voters 
 
 132.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 574–75. 
 133.  Id. at 573. 
 134.  Id. at 575. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 573, 575; Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Jowei Chen, Dec. 17, 2015, at 45:21–46:2, 
RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 137.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553. 
 138.  Id. at 575–79. 
 139.  Id. at 575–76. 
 140.  Id. at 578. 
 141.  Id. at 569. 
 142.  Id. at 578. 
 143.  Id. 
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were outraged. Once again, RWCA, CCAC and other grassroots groups 
encouraged their members to attend legislative meetings on the bill and 
speak out against it.144 A local polling firm conducted a poll which 
indicated that the vast majority of Wake County voters were opposed 
to the change.145 Representative Rosa Gill led the legislative opposition 
to the bill.146 Gill spoke elegantly on the harms created by unnecessarily 
packing black voters into districts and by manipulating population 
deviations for partisan advantage.147 Just days after Senate Bill 181 was 
enacted, many of the same plaintiffs who brought the Wright case filed 
another lawsuit challenging Senate Bill 181.148 
D.  The Fourth Circuit’s Wright Decision 
One month after Senate Bill 181 was enacted, the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the motion to dismiss in Wright.149 The appeals court noted 
that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are disfavored where a complaint sets 
forth a novel legal theory, thus rejecting the district court’s ruling.150 
The court relied on Roman for the proposition that being within ten 
percent overall deviation does not insulate a plan from attack on 
OPOV grounds, and found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that 
the plan was tainted by arbitrariness or discrimination.151 It explained: 
Plaintiffs allege in detail a redistricting that resulted in a maximum 
population deviation of nearly ten percent. Plaintiffs describe how 
and why that deviation was unjustified, discriminatory and 
unconstitutional. They do not allege that the apportionment plan 
with a maximum population deviation just barely under ten percent 
by itself supports their equal protection claim, but rather they plead 
facts indicating that the apportionment had a taint of arbitrariness 
or discrimination.152 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit flatly rejected attempts by the 
district court and Appellees to distinguish Larios, which it found to be 
 
 144.  See, e.g., Transcript, Senate Redistricting Committee Meeting, Mar. 10, 2015 (on file 
with author) (statements of members of the public speaking out against the bill). 
 145.  Transcript of Testimony of Tom Jensen, Dec. 16, 2015, at 212:1-24, RWCA I, 166 F. 
Supp. 3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 146.  See Transcript, House Floor Debate, Apr. 11, 2015, at 8–12 (on file with author) (debate 
by Rep. Rosa Gill). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  See generally Complaint at 1–18, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 
5:15-CV-156).  
 149.  Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 150.  Id. at 263. 
 151.  Id. at 264. 
 152.  Id. at 265 (internal quotations omitted).  
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“notably” similar to Wright.153 Recognizing the limited precedential 
value of the summary affirmance, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless 
concluded that the Larios summary affirmance stood for the 
proposition that the ten percent rule did not create a safe harbor from 
OPOV challenge.154 The Fourth Circuit also noted that the Supreme 
Court agreed that discriminatory treatment of incumbents and favoring 
of regional areas would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if they 
explained the deviations in the challenged plan.155 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court’s dismissal of 
the case on the grounds that it was a nonjusticiable partisan 
gerrymander was wrong on two fronts. First, the district court 
misapprehended Vieth—because Vieth’s lead opinion was only a 
plurality opinion, partisan gerrymandering cases remain justiciable.156 
Second, and more significantly, the appeals court explained that an 
OPOV case under the Equal Protection Clause was jurisprudentially 
distinct from a partisan gerrymandering case, and the Wright plaintiffs 
properly pled it as such.157 
E.  Filing of RWCA and Trial on the Consolidated Cases 
When filed on April 9, 2015, RWCA embraced largely the same 
theory as Wright.158 The overall deviation for the county commission 
plan was the same as it was for the school board plan, hovering just 
below that legally-significant ten percent threshold.159 However, in the 
county commission case, there was even more pretext for the 
justifications used to support that redistricting as compared to the 
school board redistricting.160 For example, legislative proponents 
argued that Senate Bill 325 created a superior system for electing 
school board members because it would allow voters to vote for more 
than one member, thus increasing the number of members who were 
responsive and accountable to voters.161 But that same logic did not 
seem to apply to the county commission. Since all seats were at-large, 
voters had seven members who were responsive and accountable to 
 
 153.  Id. at 266. 
 154.  Id. at 267. 
 155.  Id. at 265 (citing Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949–50 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 156.  Id. at 267. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Complaint at 2, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (No. 5:15-CV-156).  
 159.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
 160.  RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2016) 
 161.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 572. 
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them, and Senate Bill 181 reduced the number of representatives from 
seven to two.162 Opponents of the bills of course noticed the 
inconsistency between the two bills during the legislative process. 
In addition to raising claims identical to the ones in Wright, the 
RWCA plaintiffs also alleged that the one majority black district 
created by the plan was, in the context of moving from at-large to 
district elections for the County Commission, an unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander.163 One of the seven single-member numbered districts 
was drawn to be majority black.164 Proponents said that such a district 
was necessary for the county commission because of the threat of a 
lawsuit and to ensure that black voters could elect their candidates of 
choice.165 Of course, that same majority black district existed in the 
school board redistricting plan, but school board members had long 
been elected from single-member districts, and that racial reason was 
not a purported justification for Senate Bill 325.166 
The two cases were consolidated under RWCA in October 2015, 
and the court set an expedited schedule for discovery and trial because 
candidate filing for seats under the new county commission plan 
opened in December and closed in mid-January.167 The cases went to 
trial on December 16-18, 2015.168 
Interestingly, at trial, the only defendant in appearance was the 
Wake County Board of Elections—an entity that was deemed the 
proper party because it was charged with implementing the 
legislatively-enacted plan, but had no involvement in designing or 
enacting the constitutionally-flawed plans.169 In Wright, the Fourth 
Circuit held that plaintiffs could not sue legislative leaders because they 
had no role in implementing the law.170 Neither legislative leaders nor 
the state legislators responsible for introduction of the challenged bills 
ever intervened. Thus, the Wake County Board of Elections was tasked 
 
 162.  RWCA II, 827 F.3d at 349. 
 163.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 620. 
 164.  Id. at 578. 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See id. at 563, 572, 578 (noting that school board members were elected from single-
member districts, and listing proponent justifications for the school board redistricting plan; 
noting that racial reasons were listed as a reason for moving to districts in the county commission). 
 167.  Id. at 562. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F. 3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he county Board 
of Elections . . . has the specific duty to enforce the challenged redistricting plan.”).  
 170.  Id. at 261–62. 
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with defending a law that it never requested or wanted.171 The Board of 
Elections had no direct insight into the reasons motivating the enacted 
bill. While it sought to entice state legislators to testify, those legislators 
claimed legislative privilege and declined to participate.172 The Board 
of Elections nevertheless vigorously cross examined plaintiffs’ 
witnesses and offered legal arguments that plaintiffs did not satisfy 
their legal burden in the OPOV case.173 
At trial, plaintiffs called fifteen witnesses—two expert witnesses, 
Democratic state legislators, members of the school board and county 
commission, and several of the plaintiffs themselves. Importantly, 
plaintiffs’ critical expert witness, Dr. Jowei Chen of the University of 
Michigan, ran a large number of simulations for Wake County 
redistricting maps.174 In those simulations, Dr. Chen was able to hold 
constant several traditional redistricting criteria, such as compactness, 
equal population and respect for political subdivisions.175 He found that 
none of the hundreds of simulations achieved the partisan outcome 
achieved by the enacted plan.176 It was only by allowing the deviations 
in the simulated plans to rise to nearly ten percent that the legislature 
could achieve its skewed political product.177 Dr. Chen thus concluded 
that a desire to obtain partisan advantage motivated the deviations in 
the enacted plan.178 
In February, the district court ruled against plaintiffs on all claims.179 
In its decision, the court explicitly discounted all of plaintiffs’ witnesses 
as not credible, even those who were providing objective, factual 
evidence.180 The court ruled that “[i]n order to prove a prima facie case 
in a one person one vote challenge, plaintiffs must at least negate the 
most common legitimate reasons that could explain the legislature’s 
action.”181 Thus, the court applied rational basis review to the analysis, 
noting that “any conceivable legislative purpose is sufficient” to explain 
the redistricting plan and plaintiffs “have the burden to negate every 
 
 171.  Transcript of Defense Opening Statement, Dec. 16, 2015, at 14, RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 
3d 553 (No. 5:15-CV-156-D). 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 14–15. 
 174.  Transcript of Testimony of Dr. Jowei Chen, supra note 136, at at 46:19–47:1. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  RWCA I, 166 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D.N.C. 2016). 
 180.  See id. at 604–05. 
 181.  Id. at 589. 
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conceivable basis which might support it.”182 The district court barely 
cited the Wright case, let alone followed its guidance on how a court 
should analyze OPOV claims. Plaintiffs promptly filed a notice of 
appeal.183 
IV.  REFINEMENT IN OPOV/PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING LAW 
DURING THE WAKE COUNTY LITIGATION 
As is often the case in the voting rights world, the applicable 
jurisprudence did not remain static during the pendency of litigation in 
the Wake County case. Just days before its trial commenced, the 
Supreme Court heard oral argument in Harris v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission,184 and the case was decided after the district 
court ruled, but before the Fourth Circuit would take the case up a 
second time. In Harris, voters challenged Arizona’s state legislative 
redistricting plans on OPOV grounds.185 The court unanimously 
affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding the plans.186 While 
plaintiffs alleged that the 4.07% deviation reflected the Commission’s 
attempt to favor the Democratic Party, the court below found that the 
deviations reflected the Commission’s efforts to comply with Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act.187 However, the Harris Court reaffirmed the 
conclusion that the Wake County litigants had drawn from the Larios 
summary affirmance. Accordingly, a plan with less than ten percent 
overall deviation was unconstitutional (and thus could be successfully 
challenged) if “it is more probable than not that a deviation of less than 
ten percent reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment 
factors rather than the ‘legitimate considerations’ to which we have 
referred in Reynolds and later cases.”188 The Court went on to list those 
considerations it deemed legitimate: (1) “traditional districting 
principles such as compactness [and] contiguity,” (2) “maintaining the 
integrity of political subdivisions,” (3) complying with the Voting 
Rights Act,189 and (4) seeking “competitive balance among political 
parties.”190 
 
 182.  Id. at 598. 
 183.  Notice of Appeal, RWCA I, No. 5:15-CV-156-D (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2016), ECF No. 66. 
 184.  136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016). 
 185.  Id. at 1305. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 1307–08. 
 188.  Id. at 1307. 
 189.  Id. at 1306. 
 190. Id. (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 (1973)).  
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With respect to that last criterion, the Court held in Gaffney v. 
Cummings191 that the advantage of one party over another is not 
“competivie balance among the political parties.”192 Gaffney involved 
redistricting after a decennial census, not mid-decade redistricting.193 
The state legislative plans developed in Gaffney had an overall 
deviation of 1.81% in the Senate and 7.83% in the House.194 The 
redistricting Board responsible for redistricting in Gaffney explained 
that they followed a “policy of ‘political fairness,’ which aimed at a 
rough scheme of proportional representation of the two major political 
parties.”195 Importantly, in Gaffney there was no allegation or evidence 
presented that in order to achieve that goal, the Board systematically 
under- or over-populated districts controlled by one political party.196 
For purposes of the analysis in Harris, the Court assumed, without 
deciding, that partisanship is an illegitimate criteria.197 Finally, the 
Court also noted that because of the challenge in weighing the 
dominance of legitimate redistricting criteria against illegitimate ones, 
“attacks on deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual 
cases.”198 
The state of the law in the partisan gerrymandering realm was 
moving too. After many years of struggling to develop articulable 
standards for courts presented with partisan gerrymandering cases, 
litigants, law professors, and social science experts finally started to 
coalesce around several possible ways of framing the legal problem, 
which manifested in actual cases.199 The timing is likely explained, too, 
 
 191. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).  
 192.  Id. at 752. 
 193.  Id. at 736. 
 194.  See id. at 737. 
 195.  Id. at 738. 
 196.  See id. 
 197.  See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1310 (2016) (noting 
that Section 5 was the law when Arizona redistricted in 2010). 
 198.  Id. at 1307. 
 199.  See, e.g., Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting 
Simulations and the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331, 331–45 (2015) 
(presenting a “redistricting algorithm [that] can be used to generate a benchmark against which 
to contrast a plan that has been called into constitutional question, thus laying bare any partisan 
advantage that cannot be attributed to legitimate legislative objectives”); Samuel S. H. Wang, 
Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV., 1263, 1263 
(2016) (proposing “three statistical tests to reliably assess asymmetry in state-level districting 
schemes: (1) an unrepresentative distortion in the number of seats won based on expectations 
from nationwide district characteristics; (2) a discrepancy in winning vote margins between the 
two parties; and (3) the construction of reliable wins for the party in charge of redistricting, as 
measured by either the difference between mean and median vote share, or an unusually even 
distribution of votes across districts”). 
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in terms of increasing technology in the post-2010 redistricting cycle 
and an increasing belief on the part of map drawers that because no 
court had yet come up with a judicially-manageable standard for 
assessing partisan gerrymandering, there were no real checks on 
political gerrymanders.200 Such legislators could be more brazen, 
thinking that they would never be held accountable.201 Of course, these 
cases were not decided before RWCA, but the timing is nonetheless 
significant. 
Two cases filed before the RWCA decision showed significant 
potential for opening avenues of attack under a partisan 
gerrymandering theory—one in Wisconsin and one in Maryland. These 
cases articulate two very different theories of the case. While it may be 
unlikely that both turn out to be correct, there are at least two plausible 
standards percolating for later review by the Supreme Court.  One 
approach, using a Fourteenth Amendment theory, is relevant to 
discussion here. 
That case, Whitford v. Gill,202 involved a challenge to Wisconsin’s 
2011-enacted state legislative districts, and employs an equal 
protection-focused “efficiency gap” (“EG”) theory. The Republican-
controlled legislature in Wisconsin redrew the state’s assembly districts, 
resulting in 2012 election results where the Republican Party received 
48.6% of the two party statewide vote share for assembly candidates 
and won 60 of the 99 seats in the Wisconsin Assembly.203 Put most 
plainly, “[t]he efficiency gap is the difference between the parties’ 
respective wasted votes in an election, divided by the total number of 
votes cast.”204 That is, the proposed standard measures how efficient (or 
not) each voter’s vote is. Specifically, “it is the comparative relationship 
of one party’s wasted votes to another’s that yields the EG measure,” 
not the numbers standing alone, that highlight the constitutional flaw.205  
 
 200.  See, e.g., Ruth Greenwood, Partisan Gerrymandering in 2016: More Extreme Than Ever 
Before, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/sites/default/files/Post% 
202016%20Election%20Analysis%20on%20Partisan%20Gerrymandering%20Impact.pdf 
(noting “redistricting plans in the post-2010 cycle evidence more extreme partisan 
gerrymandering than any other decade in modern American history”); Thomas E. Mann, We 
Must Address Gerrymandering, TIME (Oct. 13, 2016), http://time.com/collection-
post/4527291/2016-election-gerrymandering/ (noting that litigators are working on providing the 
court with justiciable standards for assessing partisan gerrymanders in the light of the Court’s 
failure to identify one yet). 
 201.  See generally sources cited supra note 200. 
 202.  No. 15-cv-421, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160811 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2016). 
 203.  Id. at *29–30. 
 204.  Id. at *31. 
 205.  Id. at *168. 
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As might be expected, defendants in Whitford filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that the efficiency gap was really just the 
“proportional-representation standard rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Vieth v. Jubelirer,” restated, and thus foreclosed.206 The court rejected 
this argument, explaining that it needed to hear from the experts and 
better understand the metric before it could make that conclusion.207 
After trial, the court concluded that the metric was not just the 
proportional representation standard restated, and, more significantly, 
“[t]o say that the Constitution does not require proportional 
representation is not to say that highly disproportional representation 
may not be evidence of a discriminatory effect.”208 Ultimately, after 
hearing all the evidence, the court in Wisconsin concluded that with 
“plaintiffs’ proposed measure of asymmetry, the efficiency gap (or 
“EG”), the plaintiffs have “show[n] a burden, as measured by a reliable 
standard, on [their] representational rights.”209 Defendants only filed a 
notice of appeal on February 24, 2017, and thus it will be some time 
before the Supreme Court decides whether to hear the case.210 
V.  THE FOURTH CIRCUIT RULING IN RWCA 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and instructed it to 
enter judgment for the plaintiffs on both their state and federal OPOV 
claims.211 With respect to the applicable legal standards, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that while Harris was decided after the district court 
ruling, the district court failed to avail itself of, and indeed ignored, the 
Fourth Circuit interpretation of the law as set forth in Wright.212 First, 
and perhaps most significantly, the Fourth Circuit recognized that the 
district court incorrectly applied “rational-basis review of whether a 
rational state policy could explain the redistricting generally,” rather 
than the “specific, deviation-focused inquiry” mandated by Wright and 
Harris.213 Plaintiffs do not have to negate any conceivable legislative 
purpose to support the challenged plan.214 Indeed, it is now clear that 
 
 206.  Id. at *35. 
 207.  See id. at *36. 
 208.  Id. at *176. 
 209.  Id. at *95 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006)). 
 210.  Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Whitford, ECF No. 191, No. 15-cv-421. 
 211.  RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2016). The Fourth Circuit held that the district 
court did not clearly err in rejecting the racial gerrymandering claim, and thus affirmed that 
portion of the lower court’s ruling. Id. 
 212.  Id. at 341–42. 
 213.  Id. at 342. 
 214.  Id. 
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the Fourth Circuit articulated the proper legal standard in Wright, and 
Harris only confirmed that: plaintiffs in an OPOV case with less than 
10% deviation must show by a preponderance of evidence that 
improper considerations predominate in explaining the deviations. If 
they do that, they have mounted a successful challenge. 
Second, the Fourth Circuit explained that the district court also 
erred legally by ignoring the relevance of Larios, which had been 
explained in Wright.215 Instead, the district court placed “heavy 
emphasis on Justice Scalia’s Larios dissent—an opinion with no 
precedential value.” Even worse, the “district court misapplied the core 
principles of Larios.”216 Contrary to the district court’s assertion, the 
Fourth Circuit explained that Larios does not require challengers to 
show disregard for “all districting principles,” and plaintiffs in the 
instant case should not have been required to demonstrate that every 
traditional redistricting criteria was disregarded across the plan.217 In 
short, the Fourth Circuit affirmed plaintiffs’ theory of the case and that 
Larios-style attacks on malapportionment employed for partisan gain 
does create equal protection violations. 
But the errors were not just legal. The Fourth Circuit incredulously 
noted that the district court “discounted every single one of Plaintiffs’ 
fifteen trial witnesses,” and that such discounting was clear error.218 The 
district court erred in discrediting entirely the testimony of legislators 
opposed to the challenged laws, even regarding objective facts.219 Most 
importantly, the district court clearly erred in rejecting Plaintiffs’ expert 
witness Dr. Jowei Chen.220 The Fourth Circuit explained that it was not 
that Dr. Chen’s simulations were simply “better plans” or that they 
were legally required, but that they allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that illegitimate motivations, not legitimate criteria, caused the 
deviations.221 
The appeals court recognized that plaintiffs showed, via Dr. Chen’s 
testimony, that the overall deviation on the plan was caused by an 
intent to create Republican advantage in the electoral districts.222 
Moreover, following the logic of Roman and Daly, the Fourth Circuit 
 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 343. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id.  
 220.  Id. at 344. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 344–45. 
RIGGS FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2017  7:41 PM 
2017] THE ONLY CLEAR LIMITATION ON IMPROPER DISTRICTING 53 
noted that because so many of the proffered justifications were plainly 
pretextual, it was quite easy to conclude that illegitimate goals 
motivated the districts and the process as a whole.223 For example, in 
considering whether the school board redistricting created better 
alignment between electoral districts and student assignment districts, 
the appellate court actually looked at the maps in the record, and saw 
that the new electoral districts only exacerbated such mis-alignment.224 
It thus concluded that such a justification was pretextual.225 The same 
result occurred when looking at each of the state’s justifications.226  
Significantly, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed that the appropriate 
standard not rational basis, but rather one that focused on the 
motivation for the overall deviations in the plan, and suggested, 
although not so directly, that consideration of the justifications 
proffered was relevant more for an understanding of whether the 
apportionment process as a whole was tainted by arbitrariness or 
discrimination.227 Finally, it noted that even had those justifications not 
been pretextual, none of them necessitated having high population 
deviations.228 
Importantly, the Court of Appeals distinguished Gaffney and 
contrasted the legitimate consideration of “competitive balance among 
political parties” from what happened here.229 The court noted that the 
instant case, which involved a mid-decade redistricting as opposed to 
the normal post-census redistricting in Gaffney, was not an example of 
a legislature trying to ensure political fairness by creating a 
proportionate number of Republican and Democratic districts.230 That 
is what the map drawers in Gaffney were trying to do, but “the 
challenged redistricting here subverts political fairness and 
proportional representation and sublimates partisan 
gamesmanship.”231 The Court of Appeals thus concluded that 
challenged redistricting plans violated the Fourteenth Amendment, 
that the record supported only that conclusion, and ordered the district 
court to enter judgment for plaintiffs.232 
 
 223.  See id. at 349. 
 224.  See id. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See id. at 349–51. 
 227.  See id. at 343. 
 228.  See id. at 350–51. 
 229.  See id. at 347, 355. 
 230.  See id. 
 231.  Id. at 347–48. 
 232.  Id. at 345, 354. 
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Defendant sought en banc review of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling, 
which was denied.233 Defendant did not seek certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court, and thus the ruling stands in the Fourth Circuit. 
VI.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF RWCA ON PARTISAN 
GERRYMANDERING JURISPRUDENCE 
It might be easy to dismiss the significance of the case discussed 
here—these were only local bills being challenged, and plaintiffs did 
not face a defense with a vested interest in defending the challenged 
law. Indeed, such questioning may seem reasonable particularly given 
the Supreme Court’s dicta in Harris indicating that it would be the rare 
case where plaintiffs challenging redistricting plans with an overall 
deviation under ten percent succeed.234 However, when understanding 
how OPOV challenges operate in a landscape that includes more 
hyper-partisan interactions, and more sophisticated and 
technologically-advanced attempts to secure unfair partisan advantage, 
this case will have significant ripple effects not only in equipping 
litigants challenging malapportioned plans with powerful precedent 
but also possibly informing how partisan gerrymandering 
jurisprudence develops in the next few years. 
Indeed, in this hyper-partisan world, what the Court might think 
only rarely occurs (the sort of extreme manipulation of district lines 
seen in Larios and RWCA) is likely to become the new norm. Of course, 
dictum is not controlling law, and the Supreme Court may be convinced, 
if more similar cases are filed and litigated, that, in fact, such cases may 
be more than rarely successful if partisan-motivated malapportionment 
is a commonly-used tactic in redistricting. Thus, such dicta in Harris 
should not deter potential litigants. 
And it does not seem to have had that effect. The ruling has already 
been helpful to litigants in other cases. In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State 
Board of Elections, a racially gerrymandering case that alleged that 
several Virginia House of Delegate districts were drawn predominantly 
on the basis of race, one defense asserted was that political 
considerations predominated in the drawing of the challenged 
districts.235 OneVirginia2021, a non-profit organization in Virginia 
 
 233.  Order Denying Motion for Rehearing En Banc, RWCA II, 827 F.3d 333, 351 (4th Cir. 
2016). 
 234.  See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (positing 
that “attacks on deviations under 10% will succeed only rarely, in unusual cases”). 
 235.  141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 542 (E.D. Va. 2015). 
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organized to promote a “comprehensive effort to remove 
gerrymandering from the redistricting process in Virginia,”236 
submitted an amicus brief challenging that defense.237 Arguing that 
partisan gerrymandering should not be considered an acceptable 
defense to racial gerrymandering charges, the amicus pointed the Court 
to the RWCA case, urging the court that “in the face of evidence 
showing race-based redistricting, the state cannot defend a racial 
sorting by claiming that it was instead viewpoint discrimination.”238 
Amicus emphasized that this case stood for the proposition that 
“partisan gerrymandering and viewpoint discrimination are not 
legitimate redistricting criteria.”239 This explicit connection between 
OPOV claims and partisan gerrymandering is significant. 
Most importantly, however, is the role that future aggressive OPOV 
litigation might have in directing the Court to developing a manageable 
standard for partisan gerrymandering. As suggested by the spate of 
cases now challenging redistricting plans as partisan gerrymanders,240 
each employing new and more precise metrics for courts assessing 
those claims, many litigants are hopeful that the Supreme Court will 
finally be willing to establish the applicable standard and making such 
undemocratic efforts subject to judicial review. There is, of course, much 
uncertainty surrounding a potential new justice on the high court, and 
how the Court’s jurisprudence will change with the change in 
membership. However, it is important to remember that Justice 
Kennedy has been and likely will continue to be, for at least the near 
future, the critical vote in any partisan gerrymandering case. 
Justice Kennedy understands the problem with partisan 
gerrymanders as being very akin to the problem caused by plans that 
have unevenly populated districts—it is a question of fundamental 
fairness.241 As such, more litigation relying on the OPOV guarantee 
serves two purposes: (1) creating more precedent for the striking down 
of discriminatory plans with less than ten percent deviation; (2) fleshing 
 
 236.  Brief for OneVirginia2021, Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1, Bethune-Hill v. 
Va. State Bd. of Elections, (No. 15-680) (Sep. 30, 2016). 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. at 14. 
 239.  Id. at 15. 
 240.  See generally Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160811 (W.D. Wis. 
Nov. 21, 2016); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1164 (M.D.N.C. filed 
Sept. 22, 2016); Shapiro v. McManus, No. 1:13-cv-3233, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112732 (D. Md. 
Aug. 24, 2016); Common Cause v. Rucho, No. 1:16-CV-1026 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2016).  
 241.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the 
need for a “fairness principle” in the instant case).  
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out the types of expert and circumstantial evidence that can help a 
court understand how sophisticating partisan redistricting techniques 
can subvert political fairness. That is to say, when courts begin to 
understand how analyses like Dr. Chen’s RWCA analysis can provide 
strong circumstantial of partisan legislative intent, that creates a legal 
landscape in which partisan gerrymandering cases can flourish. These 
cases might also serve as a stepping stone for courts to become more 
comfortable with restricting improper partisan legislation, because 
courts can operate within the safety of the well-established OPOV 
framework, where the courts are not being asked to develop new 
standards. 
That type of precedent can also help litigants hone how they frame 
and articulate the harms wrought by political gerrymandering. And, 
ultimately, such litigation could very well inform Justice Kennedy’s 
decision, someday, to embrace a standard for measuring partisan 
gerrymanders. Litigants across the country must continue to rely on 
“the only clear limitation on proper districting practices,” and 
aggressively bring challenges to plans that use population disparities 
for improper partisan goals, in hopes that one day soon, the OPOV 
principle will no long be the “only” limitation on anti-democratic 
redistricting efforts. 
 
